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Introduction 
Toward the end of 1988, Pakistan's deteriorating resource situation caused a 
financial crisis, remnants of which still exist today. In 1988 the government's 
budget deficit reached 8.5 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), inflation 
accelerated, the current-account deficit doubled to 4.3 percent of Gross National 
Product (GNP), the external debt-service ratio reached 28 percent of export 
earnings, and foreign exchange reserves fell in half to $438 million, equal to less 
than three weeks of imports (World Bank, 1991, p. ii). 
These developments eroded the government's ability to affect the country's 
development. In fact, the encouragement of private-sector activity, particularly 
investment, is the only viable option open to the authorities. It follows that for 
policy purposes the most important issue involves restructuring government 
expenditures and their financing in a manner that would provide the maximum 
inducement to private sector capital formation, especially in manufacturing. 
Operationally, this means finding an optimal balance among the government's 
three most important budgetary items: military expenditures, public consumption, 
and infrastructure development. More importantly, since there is abundant 
evidence that the government's deficits have crowded out a certain amount of 
private investment (Kemal, 1989; Burney and Yasmeen, 1989; Khan and Iqbal, 
1991 ), the authorities must achieve this balance within the context of a reduced 
level of expenditures and/or tax increases. 
Military expenditures are an obvious candidate for expenditure reductions. At 
around seven percent of GNP in 1992, Pakistan's military burden is one of the 
heaviest in the world, and is more than twice that oflndia. But debt-service has 
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overtaken ~li~ary expenditures as the single largest item of government spending. 
In 1971 this item was three percent of GNP; by 1993/94 it had risen to 8.2 
percent. During fiscal 1994/95 debt-service will account for 8.2 percent or 35 
percent of total budget spending (Blum, 1994, p. 2), compared with 26.4 percent 
for th~ military sector (Rashid, 1994, p. 61). Apparently the government 
recognizes the burden that military expenditures place on the economy for the 
1994/95 budg~t since the ~litary expenditures.item will increase only 8.6 percent 
even though in the previous year India increased military expenditures by 20 
percent (Bokhari, 1994, p. 5). 
Against this background the purpose of this chapter is to examine Pakistan's 
macro~co~omic_ ~rospects ~or the remainder of the 1990s. In particular, and 
a~sumi~g 1t pohtJ~ally possible, we are interested in examining the scope for 
stimulating economJc growth and expansion through restrained allocations to the 
military sector1• 
~.ereas a com~arative perspective provides some insights as to the workings 
of military e~pend1tures and the macroeconomy, a full understanding can come 
only by lo~king at these relationships over time. In this regard, several studies 
have examined the manner in which Pakistani military expenditures have 
interacted with various macroeconomic aggregates. These studies can be broken 
down into four types: (I) causation ana/ysiSZ where an attempt is made to assess 
whether military expenditures initiate economic change or, in contrast, are 
atfecte? by changes in the macroeconomy, e.g., do increases in military 
expenditures cause follow-on changes in the economy, or instead, do economic 
changes result in movements in military funding? (2) linkage identification where 
the strengths of the identified causal patterns are estimated, that is, how much 
does a mpee of military expenditures alter GDP over time? (3) budgetary priority 
analysis where expenditure priorities and budgetary tradeoffs are identified, and ~4) modeling where, drawing on I, 2 and 3, military expenditures are examined 
in ~h~ con~ext of alternative fiscal packages, for example, how does varying the 
ex1stin~ size of the budgetary deficit affect the manner in which military 
expenditures affect the macroeconomy? The present study falls in this category. 
A simulation of Pakistan's macroeconomy, 1974-1991 
Drawing on previous causal and econometric tests, a 33-equation policy model 
was developed (see the appendix, preceding the "notes" section)3. The main 
concern was identifying the main links between military expenditures and 
economic activity. These links are assumed to be both direct (as with Keynesian 
demand creation) and indirect (through possible deficit-induced crowding-out of 
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private activity and/or diversion of private savings to the public ~ector. Here is a 
brief summary discussion of the more important of the 3 ~ eq_uat1ons .. 
(1) Gross domestic product is affected mainly by expansion I.~ the pnvate rK), 
and public (GK) stocks of capital, employment (EMP), and nuht~ry expenditures 
(MILX). The link between GDP and non-military expenditures was not 
statistically significant. . . 
(2) Employment increases with an expanded population (POP) and With 
increments to the stock of public infrastructure (IGT). 
(3)Military expenditures expand in line with the ~en~ral size of the economy 
(GDP), but allocations to the military compete with infr~structure (IG!) for 
funding. In addition, expanded levels of foreign borrowing ~ORFP) m the 
previous year constrain allocations to the military. The same 1s also true for 
increased levels of indebtedness to international institutions (PDII). 
(4) Non-military public expenditures also expan~ed in line with GD~. 
Allocations to this category were reduced by short run increases ( 6. MILX.1) m 
the military budget. 
(5) Gross national savings4 expand with the general growth of the economy 
but these funds are preempted (crowded out) by the current fiscal deficit (GDEF), 
as well as by the deficit in the previous year (GDEF.1). • 
(9) Public borrowing in domestic markets was largely a function of the fiscal 
deficit. The authorities' ability to borrow internationally reduced some of the 
pressures on the domestic capital markets. . 
(10) Public borrowing in foreign capital markets was also largely a funct10~ 
of the fiscal deficit. But again, increases in military expenditures reduced, cetens 
paribus, the amount of funding from this source. 
(11) Private investment in large-scale manufacturing, followed a. lag 
adjustment pattern whereby investment in any one year was undertaken to b~dge 
the gap between investors' optimal and actual capital stocks. In tum, the op_timal 
level of private investment was influenced by ~litary expenditu~es an~ ab1hty to 
attract foreign funding (BORF). Once more, this category of pnvate investment 
was crowded out by the fiscal deficit. . 
(13) Private investment in non-manufacturing activities expanded With the 
total size of the economy (GDP) and availability of savings (GNS). In contrast to 
investment in manufacturing, however, this type of investment was discouraged 
by expanded military expenditures. . 
. (I 7) Inflation is largely a function of expanded credit to the pubhc sector, 
together with movements in the international price level. . 
(18) Government credit from the monetary system was related to past deficits 
and to short run movements in military expenditures (6.MILX.1). 
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To test the model's general performance, the economy was simulated on 
historical data for 1974-1991. The results (table 6.1) suggest that compounded 
errors (accumulated errors from each individual relationship) are small. In 
particular the key variable GDP was predicted with a high degree of accuracy, the 
greatest error being 2.3 percent in 1991. Over the last ten years the simulation 
error averaged 1.2 percent. 
Although typically volatile, private investment was also simulated with a high 
degree of accuracy. The average error for the I 98 I-199 I period was only 2. 7 
percent. For employment, the corresponding figure was I. I percent. Since military 
expenditures are also affected by a set of non-economic factors, the model 
depicted this variable's past values reasonably well, with an average error of3. I 
percent over the last ten years of the simulation run. In any case, since military 
expenditures will be treated exogenously (as a policy variable) in the simulations 
that follow, this error will disappear. 
In summary, the model captures the performance of the Pakistani economy 
fairly well. Looked at in isolation, military expenditures have tended to positively 
influence GDP (see equation I in appendix). But to the extent that such 
expenditures are funded with increased levels of deficit financing, the subsequent 
crowding out of private investment may actually result not only in increased 
inflation, but, more importantly, in a net negative impact on the economy. The 
inability of non-military public expenditures to impact positively on the economy 
only compounds this dilemma. In any event, the concern of external creditors over 
the country's high military burden will in all likelihood increasingly constrain 
allocations to the military. 
Macroeconomic effects of alternative fiscal policies, 1974-1991 
A major question is whether fiscal deficits have been "too high" in the sense that 
macroeconomic performance may have been better had they not been that high. 
To assess this possibility, government expenditures were classified as either 
military and non-military (see "data sources" at the end of this chapter). Using the 
33-equation model, we simulated economic environments over the period I974-
9I, first by reducing military expenditures ten percent from their actual values 
(while holding non-military expenditures at their historical values), second by 
lowering non-military expenditures by ten percent from their historical values 
(while maintaining military expenditures at their historical values), and third by 
increasing government revenues by ten percent (with public expenditures set at 
































The results (tables 6.2 to 6.4) provide some interesting insights to the country's 
policy dilemmas. For example, lowering military expenditures by ten percent each 
year (table 6.2): 
Generally reduced the country's gross domestic product. Dividing the 
1974-91 period into two nine-year groups, 1974-82 and 1983-91, GDP 
would have been lowered an average of2.9 percent in the first period and 
2.3 percent in the latter. 
2 Private investment would have been significantly lower in an environment 
of reduced military expenditures. On average, private investment would 
have been reduced by 7.7 percent per year during the 1974-82 period and 
by 9 percent over the 1983-91 interval. 
3 In general, gross national savings would have improved with lower 
allocations to the military. This improvement declined over time, 
averaging 3.0 percent during the 1974-82 period but only 1.8 for the years 
through 1991. 
4 Finally, foreign debt would have been considerably lower, particularly 
because of the cumulative effect of reduced expenditures, i.e., while 
reductions were modest in the first period (2.2 percent) they accelerated 
to 9 .4 percent over the 1983-1991 period. 
Reducing non-military government expenditures produced contrasting results 
(table 6.3): 
In contrast to military expenditures, holding non-military expenditures to 
90 percent of their historical values would have provided a mild stimulus 
to GDP. GDP would have averaged around 1.2 percent higher during the 
1974-82 period, and 3.0 higher percent from 1983 through 1991. 
2 While private investment would have declined, these reductions were 
modest, averaging only I.I percent during the 1974-82 period and 1.8 
percent thereafter. 
3 The most significant contrast involves the savings rate. Cutting non-
military expenditures by ten percent would have increased the savings rate 
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Macroeconomic simulation ill: non-military expenditures ten percent less than historical values 
(billions of 1985 rupees) 
Year Gross Domestic Product Private Investment Gross National Savings Foreign Debt 
Sim-I Sim-III %Diff. Sim-I Sim-III %DifT. Sim-I Sim-III o/.Oiff. Sim-I Sim-III o/.Oiff. 
1974 247.6 247.6 0.0 17.5 17.7 l.l 21.l 22.8 7.5 85.6 85.6 0.0 1975 258.9 259.6 0.3 19.0 18.9 -.05 26.4 28.S 7.4 77.2 77.2 0.0 
1976 264.5 265.6 0.4 20.1 20.1 0.0 29.6 31.7 6.6 89.8 89.7 -0. l 1977 287.3 288.9 0.6 20.6 20.6 0.0 27.3 33.7 19.0 84.3 84.2 -0.1 
1978 309.3 313.5 1.3 22.2 21.8 -1.8 33.6 41.5 19.0 84.8 84.5 -0.3 
1979 327.2 332.8 l.7 23.8 23.3 -2. l 41.8 48.7 14.2 89.6 89.1 -0.6 1980 344.1 350.7 1.9 25.6 24.9 -2.8 46.3 54.0 14.3 94.8 94.l -0.7 
-
1981 364.2 372.7 2.2 27.0 26.1 -3.4 49.l SS.I 10.9 84.2 93.I -l.2 \;.) 1982 388.7 397.6 2.2 28.9 28.7 -0.7 51.8 64.6 19.8 98.I 96.6 -1.6 N 
1983 414.8 426.9 2.8 31.S 30.3 -4.0 60.8 73.8 17.6 97.1 95.3 -1.9 
1984 442.5 454.8 2.7 33.8 33.1 -2.1 67.7 77.3 12.4 101.2 99.0 -2.2 
1985 469.9 483.3 2.8 36.2 35.7 -1.4 65.7 '84.5 22.2 103.2 100.7 -2.5 
1986 494.0 512.4 3.6 39.8 38.7 -2.8 68.8 88.1 21.9 105.4 102.6 ·-2.7 
1987 527.8 548.3 2.7 43.0 42.0 -2.4 74.2 91.5 18.9 112.7 109.6 -2.8 
1988 565.9 587.4 3.7 47.3 45.6 -3.2 81.2 92.2 l l.9 115.7 112.3 -3.0 
1989 603.0 623.4 3.3 51.2 50.2 -2.0 84.8 89.8 5.6 123.8 120.0 -3.2 
1990 642.4 661.S 2.9 56.4 56.6 0.4 89.2 102.8 13.2 130.l 126.4 -2.9 
1991 687.8 707.5 2.8 61.3 62.1 l.3 98.7 123.0 19.8 129.4 125.9 -2.8 
Note: "Sim-f' refers to the results from simulation I presented in table 6.1 that established a base-line simulation 
for the Pakistani economy; "Sim-IIT' refers to the results of the simulated ten percent cut in non-military 
expenditures; both simulations are based on the structural-equation model presented in the appendix; 
"%Diff." refers to the percentage difference between the two simulations. 
Table 6.4 
, .. Macroeconomic simulation IV: government revenues ten percent more than historical values 
(billions of 1985 rupees) 
Year Gross Domestic Product Private Investment Gross National Savings Foreign Debt 
Sim-I Sim-IV o/.Oiff. Sim-I Sim-IV o/.Oiff. Sim-I Sim-IV o/.Oiff. Sim-I Sim-IV o/.Oiff. 
1974 247.6 247.6 0.0 17.5 17.8 l.7 21.1 24.5 13.9 85.6 85.6 0.0 
1975 258.9 260.5 0.6 19.0 18.8 -1.1 26.4 30.2 12.6 77.2 77.2 0.0 
1976 264.5 266.4 0.7 20.l 20.0 -0.5 29.6 32.6 9.2 89.8 89.7 -0.1 
1977 287.3 290.0 0.9 20.6 21.4 3.7 27.3 32.9 17.0 84.3 84.1 -0.2 
1978 309.3 314.0 l.5 22.2 21.7 -2.3 33.6 37.4 10.2 84.8 84.4 -0.5 
1979 327.2 331.9 l.4 23.8 23.4 -1.7 41.8 43.4 3.7 89.6 89.0 -0.7 
1980 344.l 348.l l.l 25.6 25.6 0.0 46.3 52.7 12. l 94.8 94.l -0.7 
-
1981 364.2 370.4 1.7 27.0 27.0 0.0 49. l 60.3 18.6 84.2 93.3 -1.0 
\;.) 1982 388.7 396.8 2.0 28.9 28.3 -2.1 51.8 60.3 14.1 98.l 97.1 -1.0 \;.) 
1983 414.8 422.5 1.8 31.S 30.8 -2.3 60.8 65.3 6.9 97.l 95.9 -l.3 
1984 442.5 450.8 1.8 33.8 33.4 -1.2 67.7 74.0 8.5 101.2 99.8 -1.4 
1985 469.9 480.0 2.1 36.2 35.7 -1.4 65.7 71.3 7.9 103.2 101.7 -1.S 
1986 494.0 502.9 1.8 39.8 40.0 0.5 68.8 77.3 11.0 105.4 103.8 ·-1.S 
1987 527.8 537.4 l.8 43.0 43.6 1.4 74.2 92.4 19.7 112.7 111.1 -1.4 
1988 565.9 579.6 2.4 47.3 47.0 0.6 81.2 98.4 17.5 115.7 114.3 -1.2 
1989 603.0 617.9 2.4 Sl.2 50.9 -0.6 84.8 100.0 15.2 123.8 122.3 -1.2 
1990 642.4 659.5 2.6 56.4 55.6 -1.4 89.2 104.3 14.5 130.1 128.5 -1.2 
1991 687.8 707.l 2.7 61.3 59.9 -2.3 98.7 103.1 4.3 129.4 127.5 -1.S 
Note: "Sim-f' refers to the results from simulation I presented in table 6.1 that established a base-line simulation 
for the Pakistani economy; "Sim-IV'' refers to the results of the simulated ten percent increase in 
government revenues; both simulations are based on the structural-equation model presented in the 
appendix; "%Diff." refers to the percentage difference between the two simulations. 
during the first period and 15.9 percent (vs. 1.8 percent) for the interval 
through 1991. 
4 While foreign debt would have been reduced, the gains in this area would 
have been much less significant than those associated with military 
cutbacks (0.5 vs. 2.2 percent during the first nine-year period and 2.7 vs. 
9.4 percent for the second period). . 
Another fiscal strategy would have been to seriously expand the government's 
revenue base and collection. Here (see table 6.4) a ten percent increase over the 
actual levels of revenues would have: 
2 
3 
Gradually increased GDP from 1.1 percent during 1974-1982 period to 
2.2 over the 1983-1991 interval. 
On average, reduced private investment by less than one percent per 
annum. 
Produced a dramatic increase in the country's savings rate with increases 
averaging 12.4 percent for the first period and 11. 7 percent in the second. 
4 Modestly reduced foreign debt, averaging 0.5 percent during 1974-1982 
and 1.4 percent through 1991. 
Generally, it is important to stress macroeconomic problems posed by fiscal 
deficits. But for policy purposes just as important an issue is the optimal means 
of reducing deficits, and clearly some areas of expenditure reduction are more 
productive than others in achieving this end. The critical question should be "what 
is the optimal mix of policies that will assure the economy can maintain high rates 
ofnon-inflationary, relatively debt-free growth during the remaining years of the 
twentieth century?" A new adjustment program is being put in place for this 
purpose. Clearly this is an opportune time to examine the current Pakistani 
program and to assess the alternatives open to the government. 
Policy objectives and constraints, 1992-2000 
Realistically, Pakistan's fiscal options are likely to be narrowly constrained by the 
International Monetary Fund. In November of 1993 the government negotiated 
an agreement with the IMF to borrow a total of Special Drawing Rights (SDR) 
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1,200 million ($1,670 million) in a combination of concessionary and market rate 
loans if it implements reforms and reaches certain economic targets (MEED, 
1993, p. 34). 
The loans will be a combination of an enhanced structural adjustment facility 
(ESAF) that carries an interest rate of0.5 percent, an extended fund facility (EFF) 
at market rates, and a public-sector adjustment loan (the $350 million standby 
credit approved by the IMF in September. 1993 is not included in the new 
agreement). As part of the agreement, the government pledges to take measures 
to meet the following economic targets (MEED, 1993, p. 34): 
1 Reach an average GDP growth rate of 6.5 percent over the next three 
years, 1994-1996. GDP was expected to grow by 7.5 percent in 1994 
depending on the size of the crucial cotton crop, compared with a record 
low of three percent GDP growth in 1993. 
2 
3 
Bring inflation down to five percent. The government has forecast an 
inflation rate of eight percent for 1994 compared with more than ten 
percent in 1993. 
Boost foreign exchange reserves. Reserves fell steadily in 1993 to reach 
$222 late that year (compared with $1,000 in January of 1993). 
4 Reduce the burden of foreign and local debt. In late 1993 the state owed 
$23,000 million to foreign lenders, of which $4,500 million was short-run 
debt. 
5 Continue the tariff, tax, and financial reforms, privatization and 
deregulation policies launched in the late 1980s. 
To date, the government has complied with IMF pressure by increasing energy 
prices and introducing a controversial agricultural tax as a means of reducing the 
fiscal deficit (MEED, 1993, p. 34). Petroleum and utility prices have been 
adjusted substantially, together with the introduction of a mechanism to make 
domestic petroleum prices more responsive to changes in international prices. In 
addition, the authorities' fiscal program for 1993/94 envisages a reduction in 
military expenditures by about one percent of GDP, along with a containment of 
non-essential expenditures (IMF, 1994, p. 76-77). The authorities have tightened 
monetary policy through upward adjustments in the rates of return and reductions 
in the scope of concessional and mandatory credit schemes. The framework for 
concluding effective monetary policy has been strengthened through the provision 
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of increased autonomy to the central bank. Finally, the Pakistani rupee was 
devalued by ten. percent at the outset of the 1993/94 fiscal year. This has been 
followed by a senes of small exchange rate adjustments for a total real devaluation 
of 12 percent against the US dollar. 
Recen~ government poli~ and creditor statements suggest that the country will 
be pursuing a comprehensive set of objectives throughout the remainder of the 
1990s. These include: . 
A sta?I~ r~te ?fG~P growth of between six and seven percent per annum 
- this 1s m hne with the average rate of growth since 1976. 
2 Employm~nt growth of 2. 8 to 3. 1 percent - around the rate of growth 







Inflation of five percent or lower - somewhat below the historical range 
of seven to eight percent. 
~oreign bo~owi~~ to ~xpand at a rate slower than the general expansion 
m economic act1v1ty, 1.e., around five percent or less. 
Military expenditures to decline to around four to five percent of GDP 
down from the six to seven percent range in the late 1980s and earl; 
1990s. 
Gov~rnment deficits to fall to three to four percent of GDP, down from 
the six percent figure reached in the early 1990s. 
A general expansion in th~ share of savings in GDP up toward the range 
of 18 to 20 percent, typical values for countries at Pakistan's stage of 
development. 
An expanded share of private investment in GDP. 
Simulating policy objectives and constraints, 1992-2000 
The criti~ question is whether and to what extent these objectives are consistent 
and att_amable. Of particular importance for the current study are the military 
expenditures levels that would aid in the attainment of these goals. Again, using 
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the structural-equation model presented in the appendix, several policy packages 
were examined for their ability to improve the country's economic fortunes. 
Constraining military expenditures 
Toward this end, simulation Vis essentially a "do-nothing" approach in which, as 
a benchmark, the model was solved with only the world rate of inflation set at 
three percent per annum, population growth at three percent per annum as well, 
and exports at constant prices assumed to grow at an annual rate of7.5 percent. 
Here we are assuming no major shifts in past public expenditure or revenue 
decisions. In this simulation, GDP and employment targets would be met, but the 
national savings rate would fall short of target, the fiscal deficit would expand 
rather than fall, the external gap would reach nearly eight percent of GDP, a 
figure probably unattainable in light of the likely reluctance of foreign creditors 
to finance deficits of this magnitude. Most unsatisfactory of the major indicators 
is the rate of inflation, reaching slightly over 20 percent by the end of the century. 
If a "do-nothing" or "continue-business-as-usual" approach will not meet the 
policy objectives, policy changes need to be examined. For most developing 
countries, one option would be to determine the extent to which economic 
perfonnance might be improved through cutting military expenditures. As noted 
above, however, the consequences of this approach are not clear. On the one 
hand, military expenditures appear to provide a positive stimulus to the economy, 
but on the other hand the deficits associated with increased allocations to the 
military may be financed in a way that preempts funds that might flow into private 
investment. To assess the net magnitude of these effects, several alternative 
military budgets were examined. In these simulations military expenditures were 
assumed to expand at various constant rates (2.5, 5.0, and 7.5 percent) over the 
period to the year 2000. As a frame of reference, military expenditures averaged 
7.2 percent over the 1981-91and1986-91 periods. 
Figure 6.1 presents the simulations' results on Pakistan's GDP. It begins to 
decline after 1994, with the rate of decline largely a function of the expansion in 
military expenditures. With military expenditures endogenous ( detennined by the 
model's equations - simulation V) the deceleration in GDP growth is fairly 
gradual, leveling off at around 6.5 percent per annum by the end of the century. 
With military expenditures expanded at a rate of7.S percent per annum (providing 
there were no fiscal or inflationary constraints) it would be possible to stabilize the 
growth of GDP at slightly over 7 percent per annum. Increases in military 
expenditures at a constant 5.0 percent or 2.5 percent would (in the absence of any 
other policy changes) cause the economy to decelerate fairly rapidly, reaching 
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growth of about 5.8 percent and 4.6 percent, respectively by the end of the 
century. ' 
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Figure 6.2 ~akistan: Alternative military expenditures - private 
investment scenarios 
11R 
The impact of military expenditures on private investment reflected the 
anticipated pattern (figure 6.2). The share of national resources devoted to private 
investment increases with lower rates of expansion in military expenditures. 
Concerning the fiscal imbalance (figure 6.3), only the deficit associated with a 2.5 
percent expansion in military expenditures is likely to fall within an acceptable 
range (around 4.8 percent of GDP). 
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Figure 6.3 Pakistan: Alternative military expenditures - fiscal 
deficit scenarios 
Without simultaneous reforms in tax structure or collection, significant 
reductions in the deficit as a share of GDP are unlikely under any of the proposed 
scenarios . 
Finally, simply just constraining military expenditures even at low rates of 
growth (with no other complementary stabilization measures) would most likely 
not stave off increases in inflation. As noted above, inflationary pressures have 
been building for some time. Even at an average annual growth of only 2.5 
percent for military expenditures (figure 6.4) it would be difficult for the country 
to reduce inflation below ten percent per year during the remainder of this 
century. 
Simulating policy-reform packages with constrained military expenditures 
These simulations suggest that although the rate of growth of GDP may increase 
with military expenditures, the adverse effects associated with this expansion 
negate any resort to a military-led growth model. The real question for policy -
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Pakistan: Alternative military expenditures - inflation 
scenarios 
makers must center on ways of improving economic performance while 
constraining military expenditures to lower than the historical rates of expansion. 
Several policy packages are examined. 
Fiscal Program I. While holding military expenditures at a 2.5 percent rate of 
growth, the authorities might also constrain foreign borrowing. Given the 
country's current debt situation and the high proportion of the budget allocated 
to debt-service, reduced rates of external borrowing are probably a good objective 
in and of themselves. Credit from this source is set to grow at 5.0 percent per 
annum. This rate is considerably lower than the average of 22 percent over the 
1986-91 period but in line with the average of 4. 6 percent for the 1981-91 period as a whole. 
Fiscal Program 11. To strengthen the country's acute infrastructure 
bottlenecks, this policy package would shift more resources toward public 
investment in transport, energy, communications, and the like. Expanded 
expenditures in these areas would also help to offset the deflationary effects 
associated with the planned slowdown in military expenditures. As a starting 
point, infrastructure investment was set at an expansion of7.5 percent per annum, 
up somewhat from the 6.1 percent average over the 1981-91 and 5.1 percent 
expansion during the 1986-91 period. 
Fiscal Program Ill. This set of policies would add increased revenue collection 
to Fiscal Program II. Here, implementation of the agriculture tax and better tax 
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. n increase in revenues of around 7.5 
collection should be enough t_o sustain a from the 6.8 percent revenue growth 
Thi rate 1s up some 
ercent per annum. s h 1986-91 period. . ~uring 1981-91 and 5.5 percent fort~ f reforms simulated would modify 
Fiscal Program JV._ ~he final ~~c ag~a~d non-infrastructure) expenditures 
program III by constrammg ~on-ffilht~ ercent per annum. As noted above ~ne 
to a maximum rate of expansion of 7. p fi I crisis has been an accelerat10n f h ntry' s current sea . 81 91 of the main causes o t e cou ed 8 4 percent dunng 19 - , in non-military expenditures. These ~verag . 
. t 9 4 for the 1986-91 penod. accelerating o · 
Main findings 
. hich these alternative policy-reform 
. . the manner m w . 1·k I Of particular mterest is . ...r. relative to growth that is I e y 
. noffilc peuormance . 2 5 packages might improve eco . . h wth in military expenditures at . to occur s1 "mply through constrammg t e gro 
percent per annum. . the fiscal programs are made more G
rowth GDP growth gradually im~roves as . . g c.oreign borrowing (Fiscal 
· ) Th t · simply restramm 10 • 
comprehensive (figure ~.5: a is,_ ve the general rate of expansion of the 
Program I) does not s1gmficantly impro th owth path obtained through 
· h d'ffi ence between e gr · · h 
economy. Nor is there muc I er . m I ex anding military expenditures WI~ 
carrying out program _I and that ~~1 t:o~gh ~he model's relationships. Note, m 
foreign borrowing bemg determ1_n Id th highest rate of growth throughout the 
addition, that while program IV y1e s e 
....................... 
_...._ ........ a .. • 
.............. 
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Figure 6.5 Pakistan: . GDP growth under alternative fiscal programs 
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1990s, it converges with program III by the end of the century. Program II starts 
out the 1990s with relatively low rates of growth but after 1994/95 this program's perform~nce imp~oves significantly over that associated with pr~gram I. 
. ~njlat10n. Inflationary pressures prove relatively hard to dampen. s Constraining 
m1h~ary expen_ditures to a 2.5 percent growth path, together with restricting 
foreign_ borro~g (program I) and increasing infrastructure investment (program 
II) while keeping the rate of inflation considerably below that of the purely 
endogen_ous forecast, wer~ unable to put the economy on a declining inflation 
path. This leads to several important policy implications: 
I 
2 
A clear ingredient of any anti-inflationary program must be tax reform 
Even expanding g~vemment revenues at 7.5 percent per annum (progra~ 
III) was not sufficient to reduce inflation below six percent per year. 
In cont~ast, supplementing tax reform with constraints on non-military 
expenditures (program IV) quickly suppressed inflation. This policy 
package lowered inflation below five percent through much of the period 
under consideration. 
Budget Deficit. The pattern of budget deficits was similar to those 
c~ar~cterizing infla_tion. Without tax reform, the programs were not capable of 
s~gmfic~tly reduc1~g. the s_~are of the fiscal deficit in GDP. Specifically, the 
s1mulat1ons const~~mmg military expenditures at 2.5 percent, program I, and 
program IT, all stabilized the deficit at around 5.0 percent of GDP (with program 
II eventually reducing this ratio to 4.S at the end of the century). 
In contrast, fiscal performance improved dramatically with expanded revenues 
(pro~ram III) and constrained non-military expenditures (program IV). 
Specifically, by the year 2000 program III brought the fiscal deficit down to 
around 2.6 percent of GDP and program IV brought the deficit down further 
toward 2.0 percent. 
_Sav_ing_s. As noted earlier, increasing the rate of national savings must be a key 
~bJective m any fi~ program. In this regard all reform packages produced some 
improvement. Agam the results from the military expenditures expansion of2.5 
pe~cent, pr_ogram I, and program II simulations were fairly similar, with the 
national saVJngs rate increasing from about 14.5 percent in 1992 to slightly over 
17 percent by 2000. 
Tax reforms contributed greatly to this objective, raising the savings rate to 
nearly . 19 percent at t_he end of the period. Constraints on non-military 
expenditures expanded this rate by an additional two percent to slightly under 21 
percent by 2000. 
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Private investment. Finally, increasing the share of national resourc~s invested 
by the private sector is possible under all of the progr~s exanuned. H~re 
improvements up to around 10.2 percent (from around 9.2 m 1992) ~e _easily 
obtained. But as with the other macroeconomic aggregates, a s1gruficant 
improvement in private investment depends critically on the willingness of the 
government to reduce its deficit. 
Conclusions 
In summing up, the fiscal pattern that developed in Paki~an ~uring th~ 1980s and 
extending to the 1990s is not sustainable. Over-expa~s1on m e~pend1tures, both 
for military and non-military purposes, together with sluggish revenues. and 
excessive foreign borrowing, created a situation in which further growth Wiii ~e 
increasingly constrained by debt-service, inflation, and shortages of domestic 
savings for private investors. . . . . 
But in light of the complex nature of military expenditures m both stu~mlatmg 
and suppressing growth, budgetary reductions by th_emselves. are ~nhk~l~ to 
improve the coi.mtry' s economic performance. Rapid reductions m ~htary 
expenditures are likely to impair the situation even fu_rther. Modest_ ~fforts ~n ~ax 
reform are by far the most effective means at restonng fiscal s~ab1ht~ (~ similar 
conclusion is reached in Khan, 1989, p. 19-22). The optimal pohcy ffilX 1s one of 
tax reform together with military expenditures expansion constrained to about 2.5 
percent. Unforeseen events aside, this package wo~ld en~ble the ~ountry ~o meet 
the goals established by itself and by its major. creditors m r~s.tonn~ ~ rapid, self-
sustaining growth in an envirorunent charactenzed by a dechmng military burden. 
Appendix: Simulation model for Pakistan, 1973-1991 
(constant 1985 prices) 
Structural Equations 
(1) Gross domestic product (GDP) 
GDP= - 53.4 +l.70 PK+ 1.59 GK+ 6.38 EMP.1 + 3.21 MILX 
(-1.55) (9.42)••• (2.81)••. (5.25)••• (2.75)•• 
r(adj)=0.998; SE=S.94; DW=l.96; F=2280.1••• 
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(2) Employment (EMP) 
EMP = 3.05 + 0.42 EMP.1 + 0. 12 POP+ 0.04 IGT_1 (2.9~) .. (2.13).. (2.70).. (2.19) .. 
r(adJ)=0.994; SE=0.28; DW=2.82; Durbins H=-3.33; F=907.8* .. 
(3) Military expenditures {MILX) 
MILX = - 4. 77 + 0.13GDP.1 - 0.24 IGTP.1 ~ 0.23 BORFP_1 - 0.14 PDII (-1.32) (6.49)••• (-3.08)••• (-2.44)•• (-2.08)•• 
r(adj)=0.990; SE=l.11; DW=I.66; F=403.2••• 
( 4) Non-military public expenditures (NILX) 
NILX = -29.71+0.23 GDP.1 - 2.81 AMILX_1 (-7.01)*•• (19.74)••• (-2.50)•• 
r(adj)=0.964; SE=5.38; DW=I. 74; F=229.61 ••• 
(5) Gross national savings (GNS) 
GNS = - 30.12 + 0.18 GDP.1 - 0.73 GDEF -0.71 GDEF_1 (-5.08)••• (10.88)••• (-2.35)•• (-2'.41)•• 
r(adj)=0.944; SE=5.96; DW=2.21; F=96. I5••• 
(6) Total public investment (IGT) 
IGT = 6.81+0.47 IGT.1 + I.04 IGGT 
(3.31)••• (3.68)••• (3.39)••• 
r(adj)=0.951; SE=2.37; DW=2.61; Durbins H=-I.76; F=l44.30 
(7) General government investment (IGGT) 
IGGT = 3.08 + 0.71IGGT.1 +0.23 IPMT 
(2.77)•• (5.47)••• (2.II)•• 
r(adj)=0.951; SE=I.02; DW=I.81; Durbins H=0.46; F=l67.05 
(8) Total public revenue (GRT) 
GRT =- 20.77 + 0.21GDP_1 +0.26 f.GDP.1 (-9.27)••• (25.25)••• (2.35)•• 
r(adj)=0.941; SE=2.87; DW=I.85; F=906.67••• 
(9) Public domestic borrowing (BORD) 
BORD= 12.99 + 0.73 GDEF_1 - 0.91 BORF 
(4.00)••• (5.10)••• (-2.91)** 
r(adj)=0.610; SE=5.27; DW=2.37; F=I4.3o••• 
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(IO) Public foreign borrowing (BORF) 
BORF = 14.74 + 0.48 GDEF + 0.27 GDEF.1 - 0.59 MILX 
(8.40)••• (4.13)*** (2.48)** (-6.02)••• 
r(adj)=0.715; SE=2.30; DW=l.91; F=l5.19*** 
(11) Private investment in large-scale manufacturing (IPML) 
IPML= - 4.37 + 0.78 IPML.1 - 0.07BORD_1 t-0.24MILX.1 +0.13BORF 
(-3.36)* .. (5.96)••• (-2.63)** (3.75)*** (2.66)** 
r(adj}=0.990; SE=0.59; DW=l.99; Durbins H=-0.54; F=413.6 .. * 
(12)' Private investment in small-scale manufacturing {IPMS) 
IPMS = 0.02 + 0.85 IPMS_1 - 0.006 BORD+ 0.007 NILX 
(0.43) (8.87)••• (-2.82)** (-4.26)*** 
r(adj)=0.994; SE=0.05; DW=2.12; Durbins H=-0.93; F=934.7••• 
(13) Private investment in non-manufacturing (IPNMT} 
IPNMT = 2.39 + 0.07 GDP - 0.36 MILX + 0.08 GNS 
(3.06)* .. (7.54) ... (-3.31)••• (3.24)* .. 
r(adj}=C.987; SE=0.81; DW=l.75; F=415.55*** 
(14} Total public external debt (PDF) 
PDF= 14.27 + 0.43 PDF_1 + 1.05 IGT + 9.96 ABORF_1 
(1.52) (2.84)** (4.13)*•• (2.37) .. 
r(adj)=0.874; SE=6.43; DW=2.14; Durbins H=-0. 78; F=40.20••• 
(15) Public external debt to international institutions (POii) 
PDII = - 10.78 + 0.97 PDII.1 + 1.05 IGGT 
(-3.47)*** (13.57)*** (3.13)*** 
r(adj)=0.990; SE=2.51; DW=2.28; F=869.97*** 
(16) Imports (ZN) 
ZN= - 24.78 + 0.35 GDP_1 - 2.37 REALEX + 0.96 AIGTP 
(-1.99)* (21.55)*•• (-2.37)** (2.15)** 
r(adj)=0.983; SE=5.98; DW=l.60; F=27l.41*** 
(17) GDP deflator (GDPDF) 
GDPDF = 0.081+0.73 GDPDF_1 +0.0016 MSGC_1 +0.076 UVZ 
(3.25)* .. (13.24)*** (5.50)••• (2.50)** 
r(adj)=0.998; SE=0.02; DW=2.07; Durbins H=-0.69; F=2753*** 
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Government expenditures (GE) 
GE = MILX + NILX 
Government deficit (GDEF) 
GDEF=GE-GR 
Change in GDP (a GDP) 
L1 GDP = GDP - GDP 
·I 
Lagged change in military expenditures (LlMILX ) 
L1 MILX.1 = MILX.1 - MILX_2 ·t 
Nominal public sector credit from the financial system (MSGC) 
MSGC = MSGCP*GDPDF 
Real exchange rate (REALEX) 
REAL.EX = EXR *UVZ/GDPDF 
Private investment in manufacturing (IPMT) 
IPMT = IPML + IPMS 
Total private investment (IPT) 
IPT = IPMT + IPNMT 
Private capital stock (PK) 
PK = IPT + IPT.1 + IPT_2 
Public capital stock (GK) 
GK = IGGT + IGGT_1 + IGGT_1 
External gap (EGAP) 
EGAP=EP +NFP-ZN 
Exogenous 
(29) Population (POP) 
(30) Exchange rate (EXR) 
(31) Import price index (UVZ) 
(32) Exports (EP) 
(33) Net factor payments {NFP) 
Notes: Two Stage _least squares estimations. See: SORJTEC Integrated 
Econometnc and Statistical Analysis Language, Version 6.6 Reference 
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Manual (Springfield, Virginia: Sorites Group, Inc., 1993) for a 
description of the procedure. r2(adj) =adjusted coefficient of 
determination; SE = Standard Error of Regression; DW =Durbin 
Watson Statistic; Durbins H = Durbin's H Statistic; F = F Statistic; L1 = 
year-to-year difference; ( ) t-statistic; • = significant at the 90% level; 
• • = significant at the 95% level; • • • = significant at the 99% level. 
Data sources 
The data set used in constructing the policy simulation model were taken from the 
following sources. 
The International Monetary Fund International Financial Statistics Yearbook 
(Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, various issues). This source 
presents the main macroeconomic aggregates by fiscal year. The series goes back 
to 1955, but due to the separation of Bangladesh, estimates were confined to the 
years 1973-91 (the last year for which comparable data was available). The GDP 
deflator from this source was used to obtain constant price figures for the major 
macroeconomic aggregates. 
The World Bank's Annual Country Evaluation. This data set provides more 
detail to the IMF figures. In particular, output is broken into the various sectors, 
agriculture, heavy manufacturing, etc. Also, investment is disaggregated into 
public and private, with each further subdivided. The main country evaluations 
used were: Pakistan: Sixth Plan Progress and Future Prospects, Report No. 
6533-PAK (February 26, 1987); Pakistan: Medium-Term Economic Policy 
Adjustments, Report No. 7591-PAK (March 17, 1989); Pakistan: Current 
Economic Situation and Prospects, Report No. 9283-PAK (March 22, 1991); 
Pakistan: Current Economic Situation and Prospects, Report No. 10223-P AK 
(March 16, 1992); Pakistan: Country Economic Memorandum FY93: Progress 
Under the Adjustment Program Report No. 11590-PAK (March 23, 1993); 
Islamic Republic of Pakistan: Social Action Program Project Report No. 12588-
PAK (March 8, 1994). 
Government of Pakistan. Population and employment figures are from the 
Finance Division, Economic Adviser's Wing, Economic Survey. This is an annual 
publication with detailed figures on the country's demographics. The government 
has been quite aware of the limitations involved in measuring employment and 
unemployment. This data has been evaluated at length and a new set of definitions 
has been put into effect. These definitions are more in conformity to international 
standards as to what comprises "employment" and "unemployment." A complete 
description of these classifications is given in: "Comparative Statement Showing 
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Old and New Definitions of Labour Force Concepts" Economic Survey 1992-93 
(Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, Finance Division, Economic Adviser's 
Wing, 1993), p. 112. 
Data on military expenditures were taken from World Military Expenditures 
and Arms Transfers (Washington, DC: US Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency) annual; and Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI 
Yearbook (New York: Oxford University Press), annual. Of the two series the 
SIPRI figures are more consistent over long time periods, hence they were 
selected for the analysis. The data from the US Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency was used to divide government expenditures into its military and non-
military components. Constant price figures were obtained by deflating each series 
by the IMF's GDP deflator. 
Notes 
This chapter is a revised version of a paper presented to the Peace Science Society 
section of the Allied Social Sciences Association annual meetings, January 5-7, 
1996, in San Francisco, California. 
1. Ideally, this policy would be complemented by some of the innovative 
reforms outlined in Ahmed (1994). 
2. For an excellent review of causality concepts and the methods used to test 
for causal relationships see Zellner (1988) and Granger (1988). The 
reported tests are all of the Granger type. 
3. A full description of the model, its estimation, and the underlying data 
base are available from the author upon request. Estimates over different 
time intervals suggested that the coefficients were stable enough for 
simulation purposes. Based on the Durbin-Watson statistic there does not 
appear to be a serious problem of autocorrelation. 
4. It should be noted that gross national savings is used here. Due to the 
large component of worker remittances, gross domestic savings fluctuates 
erratically. These remittances are no doubt purely exogenous and as such 
tend to mask the relationship between government expenditures, the fiscal 
deficit, and the change in savings. 
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5. 
. . budget deficit, savings, and private 
Numbers and figures f~r the mfladt1on, . us fiscal program packages are 
investment policy vanables un er vano 
available from the author. 
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